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Abstract
Economists have the habit of solving the wrong problems. They speculate
circumstantially about the behavior of agents and do not come to grips with
the behavior of the monetary economy. This is the consequence of the method-
ological imperative that all explanations must run in terms of the actions and
reactions of individuals. The critical point is that no way leads from the
understanding of the interaction of the individuals to the understanding of the
working of the economy as a whole. The solution consists in moving from
subjective-behavioral axioms to objective-structural axioms, i.e. from past to
future.
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1 Solving the wrong problem
“The physicists were shocked at the assumptions the economists were
making – that the test was not a match against reality, but whether the
assumptions were the common currency of the field. I can just see Phil
Anderson, laid back with a smile on his face, saying, ‘You guys really
believe that?’“
The economists, backed into a corner, would reply, “Yeah, but this
allows us to solve these problems. If you don’t make these assumptions,
then you can’t do anything.”
And the physicists would come right back, “Yeah, but where does that
get you – you are solving the wrong problem, if that’s not reality.”
(Waldrop, 1993, p. 142), original emphasis
What happened in the 1990s at the Santa Fe Institute was not the first memorable
strange encounter of economists and physicists/mathematicians. It is a déjà vu from
the earliest days of standard economics.
Walras approached Poincaré for his approval. ... But Poincaré was
devoutly committed to applied mathematics and did not fail to notice
that utility is a nonmeasurable magnitude. ... He also wondered about
the premises of Walras’s mathematics: It might be reasonable, as a
first approximation, to regard men as completely self-interested, but
the assumption of perfect foreknowledge “perhaps requires a certain
reserve.” (Porter, 1994, p. 154)
Science is a trial-and-error process. Economists have tried, but the standard approach
has failed. This far, observers with an understanding of what science is all about are
agreed.
The economists of the twentieth century, by pushing the neoclassical
model to its logical conclusions, and thereby illuminating the absur-
dities of the world which they had created, have made an invaluable
contribution to the economics of the coming century . . . (Stiglitz, 1991,
p. 136)1
It is an additional indication that the shelves crack under the number of books with
titles like: What went wrong with economics? The diagnoses, not surprisingly,
differ widely. What, then, went actually wrong?
Here is the answer in the paradigmatic nutshell. Ask a representative economist:
When will a blackberry picking boy stop picking and eating?, but do not tell him in
1 See also (Hahn, 1981, p. 1036), (Blaug, 2001, p. 160), (Rosenberg, 1994, pp. 216-217), (Mirowski,
1995, p. 389)
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advance that the answer should consist in a concrete number of minutes. He will
come up with the following answer:
Equilibrium is reached when at last his eagerness to play and his
disinclination for the work of picking counterbalance the desire for
eating. The satisfaction which he can get from picking fruit has arrived
at its maximum: for up to that time every fresh picking has added more
to his pleasure than it has taken away; and after that time any further
picking would take away from his pleasure more than it would add.
(Marshall, 1920, V.II.1), original emphasis
Marshall seems to have an explanation – the key words are equilibrium, satisfaction
and maximum – but he cannot utter the number of minutes. In fact, what he
says with so many words is that the boy stops picking and eating when he stops.
Marshall has nothing concrete to say about the duration of the picking, but he
asserts that it will end at the optimal moment. This is a tautological add-on that
is compatible with any outcome. The empirical questions about the measurable
picking time and the measurable quantity of berries are evaded. Nonentities abound.
Pleasure is not measurable but we are told that it is at maximum. Here we are at
the critical juncture. It is not about berries, of course, it is about method. The
method cannot, in principle, yield any concrete conclusion. Surely, one can talk
about an economic puzzle, but one cannot solve it. The moment Marshall’s account
is accepted as contribution to a scientific discourse, things go down the wrong track.
And indeed, this is what happened. Standard economics is psycho-sociological
filibuster without definitive results. It assumes three forms: vernacular, geometrical
demonstrations, and formalist-school mathematics (Debreu, 1959, p. x). The form
is of no great importance, the working of the economy remains unexplained under
each description.
To be sure, no scientist ever has nor ever will accept this problem shift (Benetti
and Cartelier, 1997, p. 204), (Mirowski, 1995, p. 357). Marshall’s berry picker
epitomizes the vacuousness of conventional economic explanation. From the berry
picker episode the way leads straight to partial supply-demand-equilibrium and then
to general equilibrium. Things do not improve on the way. From Jevons, Marshall,
and Walras onwards economists have answered the wrong question (Hahn, 1980,
p. 127). They and their successors have taken the role of the Ptolemeans in the
unfolding history of economic thought.
There are, of course, economists who came up with the right conclusion.
There is another alternative: to formulate a completely new research
program and conceptual approach. As we have seen, this is often
spoken of, but there is still no indication of what it might mean. (Ingrao
and Israel, 1990, p. 362)
Yet most economists neither seek alternative theories nor believe that
they can be found. (Hausman, 1992, p. 248)
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The incapacity to think of an alternative approach explains the secular stagnation of
economics at the proto-scientific level (Quiggin, 2010). Ptolemean progress consists
of putting just another epicycle on top of an already awkward construct.
2 The problem with savants
These savants, as Galileo put it, first decided how the world should
function in accordance with their preconceived principles. . . . He
openly criticized scientist and philosophers who accepted laws which
conformed to their preconceived ideas as to how nature must behave.
(Kline, 1982, p. 48)
A theory is a logical edifice built on premises. The premises relate to reality but
are not in a simple correspondence determined by it. Premises are selected and
formally laid down as foundational propositions or axioms. There are no rules or
fixed criteria for the selection of axioms.
What are the propositions which may reasonably be received without
proof? That there must be some such propositions all are agreed, since
there cannot be an infinite series of proof, a chain suspended from
nothing. But to determine what these propositions are, is the opus
magnum of the more recondite mental philosophy. (Mill, 2006, p. 746)
Yet there is no arbitrariness either. First, the set of axioms has to be consistent.
Second, Occam’s razor applies not only in physics but everywhere:
No more cause of natural things should be admitted than are both true
and sufficient to explain their phenomena. (Newton, 1999, p. 794)
Most important of all, outside pure mathematics a set of axioms must have testable
implications.
Whether an axiom is or is not valid can be ascertained either through
direct experimentation or by verification through the result of observa-
tions, or, if such a thing is impossible, the correctness of the axiom can
be judged through the indirect method of verifying the laws which pro-
ceed from the axiom by observation or experimentation. (Morishima,
1984, p. 53)
Simplicity and transparency are highly valued properties of foundational proposi-
tions because they are the most effective prophylaxis against the unnoticed introduc-
tion of additional and potentially unacceptable assumptions. The core premise of
standard economics is not transparent but a hotbed of hidden assumptions.
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There is in economics, or at least among the overwhelming majority
of its disciples, broad agreement as to what represents the corpus of
their subject. This corpus revolves around the concept of maximizing
behaviour, whether it be by the individual, firm or institution. (Blaug,
1990, p. 209)
The assumption of profit maximization, for one, necessitates a couple of further
assumptions. And here serious problems arise. The firm must be formally endowed
with a production function. This function must have very specific formal properties.
One of them is decreasing returns. Thus, we start with a behavioral assumption and
end with an assertion about the physical reality of production (cf. Mirowski, 1995,
p. 328).
This, clearly, is methodologically inadmissible. Reality cannot be molded to make a
behavioral assumption applicable. It is just the other way round, behavioral assump-
tions must take physical laws into account. This has profound consequences for
theory building, to wit, it prohibits assumptions like foreknowledge or simultaneous
adaptation, among others. It is widely known that economic models need not be
realistic in the descriptive sense. Idealizations and simplifications are legitimate.
This, however, does not imply that physical laws can be ignored or simplified away.
An economic model that is not physically feasible is worthless. Most models are.
In order to be applicable, the profit maximization assumption presupposes decreas-
ing returns. But increasing returns must not be ruled out a priori. They are real
since Adam Smith’s pin factory. It is an empirical question, not to be answered by
introspection, in how many cases returns increase or decrease. Hence profit maxi-
mization cannot be accepted as a general behavioral maxim. If at all, it can work
only under very special conditions. Claims of generality are therefore unwarranted.
In the worst case, the conditions define an empty set.
Two things can happen vis-à-vis a conspicuous disharmony between theory and
reality: either the set of foundational assumptions is adapted or the perception
of reality. The probability of the first alternative is low, because ‘a new idea is
extremely difficult to think of’ (Feynman, 1992, p. 172), the probability of the
second alternative is correspondingly high.
“So, Brian, what are you working on these days?” Arthur had given
him the the two-word answer just to get started: “Increasing returns.”
And the economics department chairman, . . . , had stared at him with a
kind of deadpan look. “But – we know increasing returns don’t exist.”
“Besides,” jumped in Rothenberg with a grin, “if they did, we’d have to
outlaw them!” And then they’d laughed. (Waldrop, 1993, p. 18)
The problem with savants is that they habitually try to adapt reality to ‘their precon-
ceived principles’ and that they laugh at the wrong things (Viner, 1963, p. 12).
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3 The problem of getting off on the right foot
By definition, the hard-core propositions are taken to be true and ir-
refutable by those who adhere to the program. "Taken to be true" means
that the hard-core functions like axioms for a geometry, maintained for
the duration of study of that geometry. (Weintraub, 1985, p. 147)
It is certainly in order that adherents to a program regard their premises as true and
irrefutable and stick to them for the duration of their study. It cannot be otherwise
and it makes no difference for the acceptance or nonacceptance of an approach. The
only valid criteria for theory assessment are logical and material consistency (Klant,
1994, p. 31). Problems arise only with the adherence to assumptions that have lost
most of their convincibility or have been refuted according to agreed upon rules.
Then, loyalty to the chosen premises may gradually shade into dullness.
If there have ever been, then in the interim at least, there are no good reasons left
for the conviction that the standard premises are true and irrefutable. Let us have
a closer look on what the foundational propositions are. The following precis is
sufficient for our present purposes.
As with any Lakatosian research program, the neo-Walrasian program
is characterized by its hard core, heuristics, and protective belts. With-
out asserting that the following characterization is definitive, I have
argued that the program is organized around the following propositions:
HC1 economic agents have preferences over outcomes; HC2 agents
individually optimize subject to constraints; HC3 agent choice is mani-
fest in interrelated markets; HC4 agents have full relevant knowledge;
HC5 observable outcomes are coordinated, and must be discussed with
reference to equilibrium states. (Weintraub, 1985, p. 147), original
emphasis
Without a lengthy discussion of details we accept HC1 and HC3 and repudiate
HC2, HC4, HC5 as premises, that is, we agree with the statement that the economic
domain embraces many agents that display directed behavior in interrelated markets.
This translates into the well known characterization of the economy as a complex
adaptive system.
Now, it is inadmissible to put equilibrium with HC5 into the premises. If something
like an equilibrium exists, which cannot be known at the beginning of the analysis,
then it must emerge from the interactions of agents (Mirowski, 1989, p. 459). To
put the result into the premises is known since antiquity as petitio principii and
there is a methodological ban on it since then. Equilibrium cannot be declared as
an entirely neutral solution of a system of equations because it implies a host of
additional assumptions about the real world that are unacceptable. Moreover, it
may turn out that the economy can only exist as either an expanding or contracting
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system (like the universe) but not in some intermediate state that fits the metaphor
of an equilibrium. This is rather probable.
Then we are left with the two behavioral assumptions HC2 and HC4. As we have
seen above they are not elementary and involve too many hidden assumptions.
Since homo economicus has been established as an analytical helper it has been
proposed time and again to replace him with something more realistic. With this
well-meant improvements one jumps too short and remains within the subjective-
behavioral paradigm. The hard-core propositions HC1 to HC5 in turn follow from a
methodological imperative.
It is a touchstone of accepted economics that all explanations must run
in terms of the actions and reactions of individuals. (Arrow, 1994, p. 1)
This prescription, which seems to be commonsensical with a view to the original
purpose of economic activity, has to be repudiated for two reasons. The first one is
philosophical, the second empirical.
On thorough reflection it turns out that nothing generally valid can be said about the
actions and reactions of individuals except that human agency is original.
The bifurcation of motion into two fundamentally different types, one
for natural motions of non-living objects and another for acts of human
volition . . . is obviously related to the issue of free will, and demon-
strates the strong tendency of scientists in all ages to exempt human
behavior from the natural laws of physics, and to regard motions result-
ing from human actions as original, in the sense that they need not be
attributed to other motions. (Brown, 2011, p. 211), original emphasis
As a matter of principle, human behavior is not caused but is itself the first cause
of a chain of effects. This originality is not absolute but more or less intensively
influenced or restricted by boundary conditions. We have on the one side the limiting
case that human behavior is random for an outside observer and on the other side the
limiting case that the boundary conditions are so numerous and tight that behavior
becomes virtually deterministic. In the middle range, behavior may be described
as a mixture of direction and randomness. The attempt to define, with arbitrary
constraints and an arbitrary target function, a one-exit situation in order to make
behavior definite has to be repudiated. Any behavioral outcome can be constructed
as the result of a constrained optimization (Arnsperger and Varoufakis, 2006, pp.
9-10). As Popper has reminded us, a theory that can explain everything, explains
nothing. With regard to behavior, constrained optimization is a pointless exercise.
It is possible and advisable to shelve the question about human behavior for a while.
The crucial point is that no way leads from the understanding of the interaction
of the individuals to the understanding of the working of the economy as a whole.
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The pertinent example is game theory. In the original version of von Neumann and
Morgenstern we have the strategic interaction of agents on the one hand and the given
structure of payoffs on the other. The latter sum up to zero. This setup obviously
begs the fundamental economic question where the payoffs in the economy, also
known as profits, come from. The economic key questions are: What determines
the magnitude of aggregate profits? Why is the sum normally greater zero? What
determines the distribution of profits among firms? And, finally, how does aggregate
profit develop over time? Game theory, which is preoccupied with the interactions
of agents, cannot answer these questions.
Rather surprisingly, therefore, the nature of profits remains something
of a mystery in contemporary economics; indeed, in the realm of "ad-
vanced" theory – namely the perfectly competitive general equilibrium
models – profits have disappeared altogether. This is clearly an un-
satisfactory situation. It is, first of all, illogical at best to argue both
that profits are the mainspring of the capitalist system and that they
do not exist. And second, the disappearance of profits from theory
has not been accompanied by a similar phenomenon in the real world,
where, in fact, profits (and losses) live on. Surely the task of theory is
to account for this appearance, not ignore it. (Obrinsky, 1981, p. 491)
It is pretty obvious that economic theory cannot be based on assumptions about the
actions and reactions of individuals. These are interesting issues for psychology
and sociology. Economics has to answer the question how the monetary economy
works. Therefore, all questions about human behavior have to be relocated from the
center to the periphery.
. . . if we wish to place economic science upon a solid basis, we
must make it completely independent of psychological assumptions
and philosophical hypotheses. (Slutzky, quoted in Mirowski, 1995, p.
362)
By consequence, we have to move now from obsolete subjective-behavioral axioms
to objective-structural axioms.
4 Objective principles
Could all the phaenomena of nature be deduced from only thre [sic]
or four general suppositions there might be great reason to allow those
suppositions to be true. (Newton, quoted in Westfall, 2008, p. 642)
The formal foundations of theoretical economics must be nonbehavioral and epit-
omize the interdependence of the real and nominal variables that constitutes the
monetary economy.
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4.1 Axioms
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditure
in a period of arbitrary length. The period length is conveniently assumed to be
the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have for the beginning one world
economy, one firm, and one product. Axiomatization is about ascertaining the
minimum number of premises.
Total income of the household sector Y in period t is the sum of wage income, i.e.
the product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N. Nothing is implied at this stage
about who owns the shares.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working hours.
O = RL |t (2)
The productivity R depends on the underlying production process. The 2nd axiom
should therefore not be misinterpreted as a linear production function; as a matter
of fact, it tracks any production function.
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P and
quantity bought X .
C = PX |t (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment, no
foreign trade, and no government.
The period values of the axiomatic variables are formally connected by the familiar
growth equation, which is added as the 4th axiom.
Zt = Zt−1
(
1+
...
Zt
)
with Z←W, L, D, N, R, P, X , . . .
(4)
The path of the representative variable Zt is then determined by the initial value Z0
and the rates of change
...
Z t for each period.
For a start it is assumed that the elementary axiomatic variables vary at random. This
minimalistic assumption produces an evolving economy. The respective probability
distributions of the change rates are given in general form by:
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Pr
(
lW ≤
...
W ≤ uW
)
Pr (lR ≤
...
R ≤ uR)
Pr (lL ≤
...
L ≤ uL) Pr (lP ≤
...
P ≤ uP)
Pr (lD ≤
...
D ≤ uD) Pr (lX ≤
...
X ≤ uX)
Pr (lN ≤
...
N ≤ uN) |t.
(5)
The four axioms, including (5), constitute a simulation. The simulation replaces
the inoperative set of equations as analytical tool. There is no need at this early
stage to discus the merits and demerits of different probability distributions, which,
by the way, need not be fix over time. It is, of course, also possible to switch to
a completely deterministic rate of change for any variable and any period. The
structural formalism does not require a preliminary decision between determinism
and indeterminism. If, for instance, the upper (u) and lower (l) bounds of the
respective intervals are symmetrical around zero this produces a stationary economy
as a limiting case of the growing economy.
The economic content of the four axioms is absolutely transparent: they constitute
the evolving consumption economy. One point to mention is that total income in (1)
is the sum of wage income and distributed profit and not of wage income and profit.
As will become clear in the following, this distinction makes all the difference
between good or bad economics.
4.2 Definitions
Income categories
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of
the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms. With (6) wage
income YW and distributed profit YD is defined:
YW ≡WL YD ≡ DN |t. (6)
Definitions add no new content to the set of axioms but determine the logical context
of concepts. New variables are introduced with new axioms.
Key ratios
We define the sales ratio as:
ρX ≡ XO |t. (7)
A sales ratio ρX = 1 indicates that the quantity bought/sold X and the quantity
produced O are equal or, in other words, that the product market is cleared.
10
We define the expenditure ratio as:
ρE ≡ CY |t. (8)
An expenditure ratio ρE = 1 indicates that consumption expenditures C are equal to
total income Y , in other words, that the household sector’s budget is balanced.
Stock of money
Money follows consistently from the given axiom set. If income is higher than
consumption expenditures the household sector’s stock of money increases. The
change in period t is defined as:
∆M¯H
.
= Y −C .= (1−ρE)Y |t. (9)
The alternative identity sign .= indicates that the definition refers to the monetary
sphere. An alternative wording of (9) is: depending on the actual expenditure ratio
the change of the stock of money can either be positive or negative or zero.
The stock of money M¯H at the end of an arbitrary number of periods t¯ is defined
as the numerical integral of the previous changes of the stock plus the initial
endowment:
M¯Ht ≡
t
∑
t=1
∆M¯Ht + M¯H0. (10)
The changes in the stock of money as seen from the business sector are symmetrical
to those of the household sector:
∆M¯B
.
=C−Y .= (ρE −1)Y |t. (11)
The business sector’s stock of money at the end of an arbitrary number of periods is
accordingly given by:
M¯Bt ≡
t
∑
t=1
∆M¯Bt + M¯B0. (12)
The development of the stock of money follows without further assumptions from
the axioms and is ultimately determined by variations of the elementary variables.
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Quantity of money
In order to reduce the monetary phenomena to the essentials it is supposed that
all financial transactions are carried out without costs by the central bank. The
stock of money then takes the form of current deposits or current overdrafts. Initial
endowments can be set to zero. Then, if the household sector owns current deposits
according to (10) the current overdrafts of the business sector are of equal amount
according to (12) and vice versa if the business sector owns current deposits. Money
and credit are symmetrical. The current assets and liabilities of the central bank are
equal by construction. From its perspective the quantity of money at the end of an
arbitrary number of periods is given by the absolute value either from (10) or (12):
M¯t ≡
∣∣∣∣∣ t∑t=1∆M¯t
∣∣∣∣∣ with M¯0 = 0. (13)
While the stock of money can be either positive or negative the quantity of money is
always positive. It is assumed at first that the central bank plays an accommodative
role and simply supports the autonomous market transactions between the household
and the business sector. For the time being, money is the dependent variable.
Monetary profit
Total profit consists of monetary and nonmonetary profit. Here we are at first
concerned with monetary profit. Nonmonetary profit is treated at length in (2011).
The business sector’s monetary profit/loss in period t is defined with (14) as the
difference between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with
consumption expenditure C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW :
Qm ≡C−YW |t. (14)
Because of (3) and (6) this is identical with:
Qm ≡ PX−WL |t. (15)
This form is well-known from the theory of the firm.
The Profit Law
From (14) and (1) follows:
Qm ≡C−Y +YD |t (16)
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or, using the definitions (7) and (8),
Qm ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y
with ρD ≡ YDYW |t.
(17)
The four equations (14) to (17) are formally equivalent and show profit under
different perspectives. The Profit Law (17) tells us that total monetary profit is zero
if ρE = 1 and ρD = 0. Profit or loss for the business sector as a whole depends on
the expenditure and distributed profit ratio and nothing else. Total income is the
scale factor.
The Profit Law holds, independently of the definition of property rights, in a capital-
ist as well as in a communist economy. There is nothing subjective, psychological,
or political in it. The Profit Law expresses the pivotal structural property of the
monetary economy, that is, of all actual economies.
Retained profit
Once profit has come into existence for the first time (that is: logically – a historical
account is an entirely different matter) the business sector has the option to distribute
or to retain it. This in turn has an effect on profit. This effect is captured by (16) but
it is invisible in (14). Both equations, though, are formally equivalent.
Retained profit Qre is defined for the business sector as a whole as the difference
between profit and distributed profit in period t:
Qre ≡ Qm−YD ⇒ Qre ≡C−Y |t. (18)
Retained profit is, due to (16), equal to the difference of consumption expenditures
and total income. As can be seen in comparison with (11), retained profit increases
uno actu the business sector’s stock of money at the central bank.
Monetary saving
The household sector’s monetary saving is given as the difference of income and
consumption expenditures (for nonmonetary saving see 2011):
Sm ≡ Y −C |t. (19)
In combination with (18) follows:
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Qre ≡−Sm |t. (20)
Monetary saving and retained profit always move in opposite directions. This is
the Special Complementarity. It says that the complementary notion to saving is
negative retained profit; positive retained profit is the complementary of dissaving.
There is no such thing as an equality of saving and investment in the consumption
economy, nor, for that matter, in the investment economy (for details see 2013).
5 Market clearing
From (3), (7), and (8) follows the price as dependent variable:
P =
ρE
ρX
W
R
(
1+
YD
YW
)
|t. (21)
This is the general structural axiomatic law of supply and demand for the pure
consumption economy with one firm (for the generalization see 2014). In brief,
the price equation states that the market clearing price, i.e. ρX = 1, is equal to
the product of the expenditure ratio, unit wage costs, and the distributed profit
ratio. All changes of the wage rate, of the productivity, of the average expenditure
ratio, and of the income distribution affect the market clearing price in the period
under consideration. We refer to this formal property as conditional price flexibility
because (21) involves no assumption about human behavior, only the purely formal
condition ρX = 1. Eq. (21) replaces supply-demand-equilibrium.
Note that the quantity of money is not among the price determinants. This rules
the commonplace quantity theory out. The structural axiomatic price formula is
testable in principle.
With (21) the real wage is uno actu given as:
W
P
=
R
ρE (1+ρD)
if ρX = 1 |t.
(22)
The real wage is under the condition of product market clearing equal to the produc-
tivity R if distributed profit is zero, i.e. ρD = 0, and the expenditure ratio is unity, i.e.
ρE = 1. In this limiting case, the wage income recipients get the whole product. If
distributed profit is greater than zero and the expenditure ratio is greater than unity
the real wage is less than the productivity. Under the condition of budget balancing
and market clearing the real wage is determined by the production conditions and
the income distribution.
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The real wage is not determined by supply-demand-equilibrium in the labor market.
The standard labor market theory is false. This conclusion follows in direct lineage
from the objective structural axiom set.
6 No psycho-sociology of profit, please
The individual firm is blind to the structural relationships as defined with the axiom
set. On the firm’s level, profit is therefore subjectively interpreted as a reward
for innovation or superior management skills or higher efficiency or toughness on
wages or for risk taking or capitalizing on market imperfections or as the result
of monopolistic practices or whatever else. These factors can play a role when it
comes to the distribution of profits between firms and these phenomena become
visible when similar firms of an industry are compared. Firms do not create profit,
they redistribute it.
The enterprise which has better management, better luck, superior
resources, a better product, no competitors, and so on, is likely to
make more profit than the enterprise without these advantages. Not
much more can be said about the sources of particular profit without
elaborating the obvious. (Murad, 1953, pp. 6-7)
The case is perfectly clear when there is only one firm. It is a matter of indifference
whether the firm’s management thinks that it needs profit to cover risks or to
finance growth or whether it realizes the profit maximum or not. If consumption
expenditures are equal to wage income, profit will invariably be zero, no matter
what the agents want or plan. Hence there is no need to speculate about it. Profit
for the business sector as a whole is a systemic property. Psychologism, as ever,
explains nothing. Whether profit-making is considered as good or bad does not
matter either. Moralizing, as ever, explains nothing. Profit is not determined by
trivial psychology but by the Profit Law (17).
From the analysis of the pure consumption economy follows:
• The business sector’s revenues can only be greater than costs if, in the simplest
of all possible cases, consumption expenditures are greater than wage income.
• In order that profit comes into existence for the first time in the pure con-
sumption economy the household sector must run a deficit at least in one
period.
• Profit is, in the simplest case, determined by the increase and decrease of
household sector’s debt.
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• Wage income is the factor remuneration of labor input L. Profit is not a factor
income, neither is loss. Since capital is nonexistent in the pure consumption
economy profit is not functionally attributable to capital.
• Profit has no real counterpart in the form of a piece of the output cake. Profit
has a monetary counterpart.
• The existence and magnitude of overall profit does not depend on profit
maximizing behavior of the business sector but solely on the relation of
consumption expenditure to wage income.
• The value of output is, in the general case, different from the sum of factor
incomes. This is the defining property of the monetary economy.
The fundamental error of value theory is to start from the premise that the value of
the output of goods and services is always equal to the sum of factor incomes. This
error can be traced back to Adam Smith (2008, pp. 50, 155).
Under the condition C = Y , profit Qm is according to (16) numerically equal to
distributed profit YD. The fundamental difference between the two variables does
not catch the eye in this limiting case. The equality of profit and distributed profit is
an implicit feature of equilibrium models. These have no counterpart in reality. In
the real world holds C 6= Y , hence profit and distributed profit are never equal.
All models that are based on the common sense definition total income ≡ wages +
profits are fatally flawed because profit and distributed profit is not the same thing.
None of the foregoing conclusions, which are immediately relevant for economic
policy, could ever be derived from the behavioral assumptions of utility or profit
maximization. Structural axiomatization is palpably superior.
7 Conclusion
A theory is a logical edifice built on premises. The premises relate to reality but
are not in a simple correspondence determined by it. Premises are selected and
formally laid down as foundational propositions or axioms. Axioms and their logical
implications determine the content of a theory.
Standard economics is based on indefensible premises which are in the present paper
replaced by objective-structural axioms. With this, theoretical economics at long
last advances from the proto-scientific stage to the scientific stage. A comparison of
subjective and objective profit theories makes this abundantly clear.
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